Deregulation of Letter Markets and its Impact on Process and Product Innovation by Dietl, Helmut et al.
Review of Network Economics                                                                                                    Vol.7, Issue 2 – June 2008 
231
Deregulation of Letter Markets and its Impact on Process and Product 
Innovation 
HELMUT DIETL * 
Institute of Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich 
ANDREAS GRÜTTER  
Institute of Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich 
MARTIN LUTZENBERGER  
Institute of Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich 
Abstract 
Does the European model of end-to-end competition or the US model of worksharing provide 
stronger innovation incentives for incumbent postal operators? We answer this question based on a 
two stage model with price competition and product differentiation. We find that incentives for 
process innovation in the upstream activities are stronger under end-to-end competition. Incentives 
for process innovation in delivery are stronger under worksharing, assuming that the entrant’s 
demand under worksharing is higher than the decline in the incumbent’s demand. Regarding 
product innovation, incentives depend on the access price. 
1 Introduction  
While reporting to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the 
postal directive on March 23, 2005, the commission stated that it intends to  
(…) remove barriers to competition in the postal sector so as to boost innovation and efficiency 
which in turn should benefit consumers. 1 
The OECD report from October 1, 1999 on Promoting Competition in Postal Services 
argues in a similar way: 
Introducing competition in postal services (…) has the potential to lead to important improvements 
in efficiency, productivity and innovation within the postal sector with consequences for overall 
welfare and growth.2 
                                                
* Contact author. Institute of Strategy and Business Economics, Services- and Operations Management, 
University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 92, CH-8006 Zurich. E-mail: helmut.dietl@isu.unizh.ch.  
1 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the Postal 
Directive (Directive 97/67/EC as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC).  http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0102en01.pdf  
2 Report from the Committee on Competition Law and Policy, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and 
Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/36/1920548.pdf  
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If innovation is the major objective of letter market liberalization, alternative forms of 
deregulation have to be compared with regard to their effect on product and process 
innovation. Does the European model of end-to-end competition or the US model of work-
sharing provide stronger innovation incentives for incumbent postal operators? The 
existing literature does not provide answers to this question. The sector specific literature 
provides various models of liberalized letter markets with important welfare comparisons 
(for example, Crew and Kleindorfer (1998), Cremer et al (2001), Panzar (2002), De 
Donder et al (2005), and Dietl et al (2005)). However, these models do not account for the 
effect of deregulation on innovation. On the other hand, there is a sizeable amount of 
general literature on deregulation and innovation. Earlier models such as developed by 
Arrow (1962) and Demsetz (1969) suggest that there is a negative effect of deregulation on 
innovation. More recent models such as described by Boone (2000) and Aghion (2002) 
however, show that the answer is not that simple, and that market and governance specific 
considerations must be taken into account.  
We try to fill the existing gap by developing a model that allows us to analyze the main 
regulatory scenarios of letter markets concerning innovation incentives. In particular, we 
compare the scenario of a full liberalization of the value chain (end-to-end competition) 
with the scenario of a partial liberalization of the value chain (worksharing).  
Throughout the analysis, we restrict our attention solely to the incumbent, which 
requires some explanation. Unlike the entrant, the incumbent is assumed to be in the 
market from the beginning, that is, it can plan ahead. The incumbent, thus anticipates a 
change in the regulatory environment and prepares for competition, that is, it invests in 
process and product innovation. This reflects the situation of most universal service 
providers in the postal market at the present time. Although letter markets have been 
partially liberalized (such as the markets for express mail and for letters above 50 grams 
within the European Union), the bulk of the letter mail volume still results from the 
reserved area. However, there is little doubt that letter markets will eventually be 
deregulated to a large extent.  
In order to describe this process in the simplest way possible, we begin our analysis 
with a two-stage model. In the first stage, before deregulation, the incumbent decides on 
how much to invest into improving efficiency, and on how much to invest into the 
development of new products. In the second stage, after deregulation has taken place, firms 
compete in prices. Our model is based on the duopoly model with quantity competition and 
product differentiation by Rosenkranz (2003). However, unlike Rosenkranz, who analyzes 
a Cournot model, we develop a Bertrand model with differentiated products, which allows 
for a more natural application to letter markets. 
In the next section, we introduce the basic structure of our model. In subsections 2.1 
and 2.2, we solve our model for the regulatory scenarios of end-to-end competition and 
worksharing. In Section 3, we compare the incumbent’s incentives for process and product 
innovation under end-to-end competition with those under worksharing. We solve the 
related first-order conditions separately and study their properties. This allows us to get 
some intuition on what is going on in our model. However, the first order conditions 
mutually depend on each other. Therefore, we use calibration results in Section 4 to get an 
overall view on innovation incentives under different regulatory regimes, before 
concluding in Section 5. 
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2 The model  
How do we model innovations? Philosophically speaking, innovations are unknown future 
developments that cannot be transformed into current knowledge. In short, innovations 
cannot be modeled. What can be modeled, however, are innovation incentives. Therefore, 
we model the effect of deregulation on the incumbent’s incentives to invest in product and 
process innovation. 
There are two different approaches in the literature to model product innovation in 
differentiated industries. The first approach, as applied in Bonanno and Haworth (1998), 
builds on the assumption of heterogeneity in tastes across consumers. Product innovation is 
modeled as vertical improvements in a product itself. In this type of model only the higher 
quality product enjoys positive demand if prices are equal. The second approach developed 
by Bester and Petrakis (1993) builds on the assumption, that consumers prefer product 
variety. Thus, as mentioned in Rosenkranz (2003, p.185), “the innovation (…) is simply 
different and increases consumers’ valuation of the product because of preferences for 
distinct varieties.” This definition of product innovation allows for a better application to 
the letter market. Given the high quality services offered by most of the incumbents in the 
European Union,3 it is more natural to consider not only qualitative improvements but also 
new products that have a lower quality as product innovation. The assumption of 
preferences for product variety influences demand in the following way: If two 
differentiated products are offered at the same price, both products enjoy positive demand. 
In contrast to the earlier work of Bester and Petrakis (1993), which concentrates on process 
innovation, Rosenkranz (2003) used this approach and developed a model, which includes 
process as well as product innovation. However, unlike Rosenkranz, who analyzes a 
Cournot model, we develop a Bertrand model with differentiated products. 
On the supply side, we model an incumbent i  and an entrant e . The entrant represents 
a set of entrants behaving like a competitive fringe. The incumbent and the entrant produce 
quantities ix  and ex , respectively. Production consists of the upstream activities collection, 
sorting and transportation denoted by u  and the downstream activity delivery denoted by 
d . 
Our model consists of two stages. At stage 1, the incumbent invests in product and 
process innovation. At stage 2, after deregulation, the incumbent and entrant compete in 
prices. 
Let us turn to stage 1. Process innovation decreases the incumbent’s marginal costs for 
either upstream or downstream activities. An example of a major process innovation is the 
introduction of optical character recognition technology, which allows postal operators to 
sort the majority of all mail automatically. A current example of a process innovation is the 
use of radio frequency identification technology instead of barcodes, allowing for the 
identification of individual letters without having to separate them first. Several incumbent 
postal operators have recently undertaken major reorganization programs with the prime 
goal of cost savings. Examples are USPS’ large scale upgrade project, DPWN’s STAR 
project, and Swiss Post’s REMA project. Returning to our model, the larger the difference 
between the incumbent’s initial and final marginal costs, 0c  and ic , respectively, the 
higher are the innovation costs, that is, there are decreasing returns to scale from 
investment into innovation. We define the cost reduction through innovation as 
                                                 
3 Nearly 90% of letters in the European Union are delivered one day after posting (WIK, 2006).  
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i ccz −≡ 0 . Following D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume that there are 
increasing marginal costs of innovation. The incumbent’s cost function for process 
innovation is 
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where },{ dus∈ . It makes no sense for the incumbent to invest in order to increase its 
marginal cost. Therefore, we restrict iz  to be non-negative that is 0>iz . 
The incumbent can decrease its degree of product substitutability iδ , that is, increase 
the degree of product differentiation through product innovation. Figure 1 illustrates the 
degree of product substitutability. )5.0,0[∈eδ  is the entrant’s degree of product 
substitutability, which is exogenously given. ]5.0,0[0 ∈δ  is the incumbent’s initial degree 
of product substitutability, and ],0[ 0δδ ∈i  is the incumbent’s degree of product 
substitutability after product innovation. ie δδδ += , the overall degree of product 
substitutability, is simply the sum of the incumbent’s and the entrant’s degree of 
substitutability. If δ  tends to zero, then both firms effectively become monopolists. If δ  
tends to one, then the goods of both firms are perfect substitutes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Degree of product substitutability 
Examples of product innovations in the postal sector are quality improvements such as 
track and trace. In addition, our model also covers investments into brand image as 
currently observed for example in liberalized power markets. The incumbent’s cost 
function for product innovation is 
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where ii δδγ −≡ 0 .  
On the demand side, we assume that a sender’s utility depends on the quantity of letters 
sent, and that consumers prefer product variety. The utility function of a representative 
sender is given by 
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where the parameter ],max[ ei cca >  influences market size, y  is the amount of money 
spent on other goods. In contrast to Rosenkranz (2003), we assume that 0/ 22 <∂∂ δU , 
which indicates decreasing marginal utility of product differentiation. 
 From the utility function (3) we derive the following demand functions: 
 
 eii ppax δδ +−−= )1( , (4) 
 iee ppax δδ +−−= )1( . (5) 
 
The demand structure shows the main difference between the approach developed by 
Rosenkranz (2003), and classical models of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. 
Consumers demand a bit of every available good instead of consuming only their most 
preferred product. Therefore, each product introduced to the market enjoys positive 
demand.  
We solve our model through backward induction. At stage 2, the entrant’s equilibrium 
price is equal to its exogenous marginal costs ec . In the following subsections, we derive 
the solutions for end-to-end competition and worksharing. 
2.1 End-to-end competition 
Given the incumbent’s profit function 
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we obtain the incumbent’s profit maximizing price: 
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The incumbent’s corresponding demand is 
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Using (6) and (7), and substituting (8), we can write the incumbent’s reduced form 
profit function for the first stage of the incumbent’s decision process: 
 
  2)(),,,( ∗∗ = ieieii xcc δδπ . (9) 
 
We use our definitions of si
ss
i ccz −≡ 0  and ii δδγ −≡ 0 to rewrite the right hand side of 
equation (8), which allows us to rewrite the incumbent’s maximization problem in the first 
stage as a function of siz and iγ : 
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where the incumbent’s strategy set for the first stage is given by 3R),,( ∈idiui zz γ , 
with ],0[ 0
uu
i cz ∈ , ],0[ 0ddi cz ∈ , and ],0[ 0δγ ∈i . 
Differentiating (10) with respect to the cost reduction through innovation siz , solving 
for  ′K , and substituting the incumbent’s equilibrium demand leads to: 
 
  ∗′ = is xK . (11) 
 
Thus, the incumbent’s marginal revenue from investing in process innovation is 
proportional to the incumbent’s profit maximizing demand. 
Differentiating (10) with respect to iγ , solving for ´G , and substituting the incumbent’s 
equilibrium demand leads to: 
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The incumbent’s marginal revenue of product innovation is influenced by the incumbent’s 
demand and, in addition, by a factor including the entrant’s marginal cost. For technical 
reasons notice that 2<− eca  is a necessary condition in order to observe a profit 
maximum. 
2.2 Worksharing 
In case of worksharing, the entrant’s marginal cost depends on the access price. The access 
price is the price that the entrant must pay to the incumbent in order to deliver one piece of 
the entrant’s mail. The access price either can be the result of negotiations between the 
incumbent and the entrant, or is directly determined by the regulatory authority. For our 
analysis, we do not focus on the determination of the welfare maximizing access price. 
Instead, we are interested in the effect of the access price on the incumbent’s innovation 
incentives. Therefore, we treat the access price as an exogenous variable. The incumbent’s 
profit function for the second stage changes to 
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where parameterα  is the access price. 
Due to the assumption that there is a set of entrants behaving like a competitive fringe, 
the entrant’s equilibrium price equals the entrant’s marginal cost, which is equal to the sum 
of the entrant’s marginal upstream cost and the access price: 
 
 α+=∗ uee cp . (14) 
 
Maximizing the incumbent’s profit function while taking into account the entrant’s 
equilibrium price, we obtain the incumbent’s profit maximizing price: 
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The incumbent’s corresponding demand is 
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Note that the incumbent’s equilibrium demand does not depend on the access price. This 
result is caused by two offsetting effects. If the access price increases by αΔ  and therefore 
the price of the entrant will increase by αΔ , equation (4) implies an increase in the 
incumbent’s demand by αδΔ . However, as prices are strategic complements, the 
incumbent will raise its price in accordance with equation (15) by αδΔ . As a result, the 
incumbent’s demand will decrease by αδΔ , which offsets the effect of the increase in the 
entrant’s price. 
Given equations (14) and (15), the corresponding demand for the entrant is 
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Using the incumbent’s profit function and the profit maximizing prices, rearranging 
and substituting (17), we can write the incumbent’s reduced form profit function for the 
first stage: 
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Again, we use the definitions si
ss
i ccz −≡ 0  and ii δδγ −≡ 0  to rewrite the reduced form 
profit function as a function of siz and iγ : 
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Differentiating the reduced form profit function with respect to uz , solving for
′
uK , and 
substituting the incumbent’s equilibrium demand leads to:  
 
 ∗′ = iu xK , (20) 
 
By differentiating the reduced form profit function with respect to the cost reduction in 
downstream activities, we find the following first order condition for downstream process 
innovation: 
 
 ∗∗′ += eid xxK , (21) 
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The incumbent’s marginal revenue of downstream process innovation is proportional to the 
incumbent’s and the entrant’s demand, since the incumbent delivers the entrant’s mail. 
Differentiating the reduced form profit function with respect to the incumbent’s degree 
of product substitutability and solving for G′  leads to: 
 
 ))((2)(' * ue
d
i
u
e
d
ii cacccaxG −−−+−−= ααδ . (22) 
 
In the case that the access price equals the incumbent’s profit maximizing downstream 
cost, the incumbent’s marginal revenue of product innovation under worksharing equals 
the incumbent’s marginal revenue of product innovation under end-to-end competition: 
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d
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3 Comparing end-to-end competition and worksharing 
For process innovation, as well as for product innovation, we first analyze the simpler case 
of end-to-end competition to get some intuition of what is going on in our model. 
Afterwards, we compare the corresponding marginal revenues of process and product 
innovation in order to analyze the effect of different regulatory regimes on innovation 
incentives.  
3.1 Process innovation 
Figure 2 shows the incumbent’s marginal cost and revenue functions for process 
innovation under end-to-end competition. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that an outward 
shift of the marginal revenue function leads to an increase of innovation incentives.  
We have three reasons that lead to such an outward shift of the marginal revenue 
function. First an increase in the market size a , second an increase of the entrant’s 
marginal cost, and third a decrease in the degree of product substitutability. All of these 
factors results in a higher demand for the incumbent. As shown in equation (11) for the 
whole value chain, the marginal revenues of cost reduction depend directly on the demand 
of the incumbent. Such an increase in marginal revenues will lead to higher innovation 
incentives. On the other hand, if the degree of product substitutability increases or the 
marginal cost of the entrant decreases, the incumbent’s incentives for process innovation 
will decrease. From equations (16) and (20), it becomes clear that the effect described for 
end-to-end competition, is also observable for process innovation in the upstream 
activities. 
In order to analyze the innovation incentives for the upstream activities between end-
to-end competition and worksharing, we can compare the incumbent’s demand under end-
to-end competition (8) and under worksharing (16). If the incumbent’s downstream cost 
under worksharing is the same as the cost of the entrant under end-to-end competition, the 
incumbent’s demand is the same in both cases. However, there is empirical evidence that 
delivery, that is the downstream activity, exhibits strong economies of scale (see Rogerson 
and Takis (1993) and Cazals et al (1997)). Moreover, due to consumer switching costs, the 
incumbent usually retains a larger share of the market than any entrant does even after 
markets are fully deregulated. It follows from these considerations that the incumbent’s 
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downstream cost under worksharing is lower than the entrant’s downstream cost under 
end-to-end competition, that is )2()( eecwsc de
d
i < . 
 
 
Figure 2: )( izMC  and )( izMR  under end-to-end competition 
As mentioned above, innovation incentives depend on the incumbent’s equilibrium 
demand. If we compare (8) and (16) and use the assumption that downstream activity 
exhibits strong economies of scale, it is easy to see that the incumbent’s demand is larger 
under end-to-end competition than under worksharing. Therefore, we conclude that the 
incumbent’s incentives for process innovation in the upstream activities are stronger under 
end-to-end competition than under worksharing. 
The reason for the lower demand under worksharing is the price setting behaviour of 
the incumbent. We rewrite the profit-maximizing price of the incumbent under end-to-end 
competition as 
[ ]iei cpap ++−=∗ δδ )1(2
1  (24) 
 
and the optimal price under worksharing as 
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Let us assume that the price of the entrant remains unchanged and that we observe 
economics of scale in the downstream activities, that is )()2( wsceec di
d
e >=α . Then, it 
becomes clear by equations (24) and (25) that the incumbent will charge a higher price 
under worksharing. This follows as the incumbent can generate additional profit through 
additional demand of the entrant.  
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In order to analyze the innovation incentives for the downstream activities between 
end-to-end competition and worksharing, we cannot only compare the incumbents demand 
under the different regulatory regimes. As shown by equation (21), marginal revenues for 
innovation in downstream activities are given by total demand. As mentioned above for 
innovation in upstream activities, the incumbent’s demand under worksharing is lower 
than under end-to-end competition. This reduces the incumbent’s incentives for 
downstream process innovation. However, the incumbent’s incentives for downstream 
process innovation are higher under worksharing, as long as the entrant’s demand under 
worksharing is higher than the decline in the incumbent’s demand. 
If total demand under worksharing is higher or lower compared with the demand of the 
incumbent under end-to-end competition depends on the access price. However, it is 
obvious that total demand and the access price are negatively related. If the access price 
increases, we have a direct effect on the price of the entrant and, because prices are 
strategic complements, an indirect effect on the price of the incumbent. If ∗ip  and ep  
increase, total demand will decrease. Therefore we have higher incentives for process 
innovation under worksharing if the access price is sufficiently low.  
3.2 Product innovation 
Figure 3 shows the incumbent’s marginal cost and revenue functions for product 
innovation under end-to-end competition. Furthermore, it shows what happens if the 
incumbent’s demand increases under end-to-end competition.  
As mentioned above, we need 2<− eca  to observe a profit maximum. We use this 
fact to conclude that the slope of the incumbent’s marginal revenue function is smaller 
than the slope of the marginal cost function, that is 1)(5.0 2 <− eca . 
As shown in Figure (3), an outward shift of the incumbent’s marginal revenue function 
results in a larger reduction of iδ , that is, the incumbent’s incentives for product 
innovation will increase. Notice that the exogenous variables ec  and eδ influence the 
slope, as well as the intercept of the marginal revenue function. If we observe a shift in the 
marginal revenue function, the size of the change in innovation incentives depends on the 
marginal cost of the entrant ec . As the slope of the marginal revenue function is 
2)(5.0 eca − , we observe a flatter marginal revenue function if we observe a higher value of 
ec . Therefore, the effect of a shift in the marginal revenue function becomes smaller if the 
entrant has high marginal cost. 
As in the case of process innovation, we start with an analysis of different effects that 
cause a shift in the marginal revenue function under end-to-end competition. 
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Figure 3: )( iMC γ and )( iMR γ  under end-to-end competition 
First, we consider the effect of the entrants marginal cost on the innovation incentives 
of the incumbent. The sign of this effect depends on marginal cost, as well as on the degree 
of product substitutability. If 
( ) ( )( )e
i
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−
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2
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higher marginal cost of the entrant leads to an outward shift of the marginal revenue 
function and vice versa. 
For simplicity, we consider just two simple market entry strategies for the entrant to get 
some intuition for this result. Let us assume that the entrant chooses a low level of product 
differentiation (high value of eδ ) and has a low marginal cost ec , that is, inequality (26) is 
satisfied. Then, an increase in the marginal cost of the entrant will cause higher incentives 
for product innovation. The intuition for this result is the same as in the case of process 
innovation. Due to the fact that an increase in the marginal cost of the entrant will increase 
the price of the entrant, the demand for the incumbent will also increase. Higher incentives 
for product innovation follow from this result, as demand is the main stimulus of 
innovation. 
In contrast, if we assume that the entrant chooses a high level of product differentiation 
(low value of eδ ) and high marginal cost ec , a further increase in ec  will reduce the 
innovation incentives of the incumbent. Intuitively, if the entrant’s costs are relatively 
high, a further increase in the entrant’s marginal cost will only lead to a small increase in 
the incumbent’s demand, because consumers prefer product variety. Therefore, if the 
entrant has high marginal costs a further increase in ec  yields lower innovation incentives 
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for the incumbent. The incumbent chooses a lower degree of product substitutability to 
exploit the competitive advantage of the lower marginal cost.  
Another parameter that can cause an outward shift of the marginal revenue graph is the 
degree of product substitutability. An increase in the value of eδ  will also lead to higher 
innovation incentives. The reason for this is that lower values of δ  will increase the 
demand of the incumbent, because consumers prefer product variety. It can be seen by 
equation (8) that the demand of the incumbent is strictly decreasing in δ . Furthermore, 
marginal revenue of the incumbent is increasing in its own demand. For these two reasons, 
marginal revenue will increase if we observe an increase in the degree of product 
differentiation, or equivalent a decrease in δ . 
However, as mentioned above, the size of this effect depends on the marginal cost of 
the entrant ec . As the slope of the marginal revenue function is 
2)(5.0 eca − , we observe a 
flatter marginal revenue function if we observe a higher value of ec . This means that the 
reaction on an outward shift of the marginal revenue function becomes smaller. This result 
is quite intuitive. A higher marginal cost of the entrant and therefore a higher price of the 
entrant have a positive effect on the demand of the incumbent. But this effect becomes 
smaller if the degree of product differentiation increases. Therefore, it is optimal to 
increase the degree of product differentiation by a smaller amount if the entrant has high 
marginal cost than in the case of a low cost entrant. 
Comparing the incumbent’s marginal revenue functions for product innovation under 
end-to-end competition (12) and under worksharing (equations (22) and (23)), we can see 
that incentives for product innovation are unaffected by entry regulation as long as 
d
WSic ,=α  and d EEedWSi cc 2,, = .  
If we consider the more realistic case, using the assumption of economics of scale in 
delivery, that is )()2( wsceec di
d
e > , we observe different effects. We can use our analysis 
of process innovation to conclude that the demand of the incumbent is lower under 
worksharing than under end-to-end competition, which reduces the incentives for product 
innovation. However, if we assume that )()2( wsceec di
d
e > , it is not clear if marginal 
revenues under end-end-competition (equation (12)) are higher or lower than the first term 
in equation (22). Furthermore, the second term in equation (22) is strictly positive as long 
as the access price is larger than the marginal downstream costs of the incumbent after 
innovation, that is, dic>α . 
Therefore, we have two opposite effects on the incentives for product innovation. 
Whether the incentives for process innovation are higher or lower under worksharing 
depends on the size of these effects. However, the size of the effect on the demand of the 
incumbent and the second term in equation (22) depend not only on the degree of product 
substitutability but also on the cost differences after innovation. As the incentives for 
product and process innovation are not independent, we cannot use our analytical results to 
get a clear result regarding the incentives for product innovation. We try to solve these 
interdependencies by calibrating the model in the next section.  
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4 Calibration 
By calibrating our model, we can obtain an estimate on the extent of innovation under end-
to-end competition and worksharing. Our goal is to obtain a relative comparison between 
end-to-end competition and worksharing. Calibration is based on Swiss data: We make use 
of the average costs and market size information quoted in Dietl, Trinkner and Bleisch 
(2005). Fixed costs do not enter the calculation of obtaining the relative levels of 
innovation. However, as a result of ignoring fixed costs, the overall level of the 
incumbent’s profit has no meaning. Nevertheless, this is not a problem since we are only 
interested in the relative comparison between scenarios. Note also that we can compare 
profit and consumer surplus on a relative basis. However, we cannot add total profits and 
consumer surplus to obtain a meaningful value for the economy’s overall surplus.  
Calibration has been undertaken for a very wide range of possible parameters. The 
results below only show one reference point for end-to-end competition and three for 
worksharing. Additional reference points do not yield additional qualitative results. The 
access price must be lower than the incumbent’s initial marginal downstream cost; 
otherwise the model’s output cannot be interpreted. Furthermore, we assume that the 
access price is higher then the downstream cost of the incumbent after innovation, that is, 
d
ic>α . Results are summarized in Table 1 and Figure 4. 
 
  End-to-End WS_low_α WS_med_α WS_high_α 
zu 0.2188 0.1289 0.0593 0.0067 
zd 0.2188 0.2561 0.1163 0.0133 
Γ 0.1750 0.1348 0.0727 0.0093 
Profit_Inc 0.0479 0.0183 0.0053 0.0001 
Profit_Ent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CS 0.6354 0.2625 0.1279 0.0152 
Table 1: Calibration results 
An increasing access price leads to lower investments into process innovation and 
lower investments into product innovation. Investments into upstream process innovation 
are higher under end-to-end competition regardless of the access price. For a sufficiently 
high access price, investments into downstream process innovation are higher under end-
to-end competition as well. The calibration results are in line with our findings in Section 
3.2. 
We could not answer the question whether incentives for product innovation are higher 
under end-to-end competition or worksharing in the theoretical part. Given the results of 
the calibration, we get a clear picture on the incentives for product innovation. Incentives 
for product innovation are higher under end-to-end competition. This result is independent 
of the access price. However, we find a similar result as for process innovation. An 
increase in the access price will reduce the incentives for product innovation under 
worksharing.  
The reason for the negative effect of the access price on innovation incentives is the 
assumption of marginal cost pricing for the entrant and the price setting behavior of the 
incumbent. As mentioned in Section 2.2, an increase in the access price will result in 
higher prices for both the entrant and the incumbent. Therefore, an increase in the access 
price will reduce the demand of the incumbent, as well as the demand of the entrant. 
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Because innovation incentives are proportional to demand, it becomes clear that a higher 
access price will reduce innovation incentives.  
Consumer surplus (CS) decreases with a higher access price. Higher investments into 
innovation increases consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is higher under end-to-end 
competition regardless of the access price.  
Since both the incumbent’s profit as well as consumer surplus is larger under end-to-
end competition, the economy’s overall surplus is larger under end-to-end competition. By 
the same logic, the economy’s overall surplus is larger under a low access price than under 
a high access price. 
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Figure 4: Calibration results 
5 Conclusion 
Our results can be summarized as follows: The incumbent’s incentives for process 
innovation in the upstream activities are stronger under end-to-end competition than under 
worksharing. Incentives for process innovation in delivery are stronger under worksharing, 
assuming that the entrant’s demand under worksharing is higher than the decline in the 
incumbent’s demand. Regarding product innovation, incentives depend on the whole set of 
exogenous parameters. Furthermore, we observe interdependency between product and 
process innovation.  
In addition, we analyze whether, under worksharing, an increase in the access price 
will increase or decrease innovation incentives. We find that for process innovation, the 
effect of the access price is negative. For product innovation, we observe two opposite 
effects of the access price. The size of these effects depends also on the market entry 
strategy of the entrant and the cost advantages of the incumbent in downstream activities. 
What advice can be given to the regulatory authorities? In a nutshell, if the incumbent 
postal operator under consideration possesses an efficient delivery network, but still has a 
low level of automation in sorting, then a full liberalization sets the right incentives for 
innovation. On the other hand, if the incumbent features advanced sorting technology, but 
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there is still room for cost savings in delivery, then a partial liberalization of the value 
chain can set the right incentives. 
If a partial liberalization is chosen, it should be taken into account that a lower access 
price is more conducive to innovation. However, if the access price is too low, the 
incumbent postal operator loses incentives to develop new products. 
As we have shown, innovation incentives are negative related to the access price under 
worksharing. However, regarding the access price further research is necessary. One 
possible extension of this paper can include the question of an optimal access policy. Such 
an analysis could address the question of welfare and innovation maximizing 
determination of the access price.  
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